Corporations - Statute Barring Corporate Mortuaries Contravenes New Jersey Constitution by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 6 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1956 Article 14 
Corporations - Statute Barring Corporate Mortuaries Contravenes 
New Jersey Constitution 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Corporations - Statute Barring Corporate Mortuaries Contravenes New Jersey 
Constitution, 6 DePaul L. Rev. 159 (1956) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol6/iss1/14 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE NOTES
a matter of state reserved powers involved, the exclusionary intent must
be clearly manifested.
In the light of previous decisions in relation to pre-emption, and noting
that in the Nelson case there was a situation where the inherent police
power of the states was in conflict with the inherent power of the federal
government to protect itself, it would appear that the court has extended
the pre-emption concept.
CORPORATIONS-STATUTE BARRING CORPORATE
MORTUARIES CONTRAVENES NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION
Plaintiffs in this action challenged the constitutionality of that part of
the Mortuary Science Act which forbade the conduct of funeral directing
by a corporation.' A declaratory judgment voiding this statute was sought
upon the constitutional contention that its requirements, insofar as they
forbid the conduct of the undertaking business by corporations are un-
duly restrictive of private enterprise and an improper exercise of the
police power. The court deemed this statute an attempt by the legislature
to constitute the mortuary science a profession rather than a business. The
court refused to categorize the science and concluded that the provisions
of the statute and the rules involved must be considered as unduly restric-
tive of the right of private property, and thus an improper exercise of the
police power. Trinka Services, Inc. v. State Board of Mortuary Science,
40 N.J. Super. 238, 122 A. 2d 668 (1956).
It is established law that the state may deny to corporations the right
to practice professions and may insist upon the personal obligation of the
individual practitioners.2 The proposition appears to be founded upon the
idea that such practice is against public policy because it interferes with or
excludes the desired personal relationship between professional 'persons
and those who consult them.3
The question of whether undertaking is a business or a profession has
been involved in much litigation and authorities are in general agreement
that undertaking is a business and not a profession.4 Considering the spe-
cial skill, education and training required of a funeral director, the occu-
I N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) c. 45 § 7-32 and § 7-81.
2 Winberry v. Hallihan, 361 Ill. 121, 197 N.E. 552 (1935); C. J. S., Corporations § 956
(1940).
3 State v. Winninshiek Co-op. Burial Ass'n, 237 Iowa 556, 22 N.W. 2d 800 (1946).
Consult 165 A.L.R. 1092 for further discussion.
4 Frizen v. Poppy, 17 N.J. Super. 390; Bond v. Cooke, 237 App. Div. 229, 262 N.Y. S.
199 (1932); Building Comm'r of Brookline v. McManus, 263 Mass. 270, 160 N.E. 887
(1928); O'Reilly v. Erlanger, 108 App. Div. 318, 95 N.Y. S. 760 (1905).
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pation does partake of the nature of a profession, but has nevertheless
been held to be a business.5 There are many other occupations which re-
quire training, examining and licensing. They are not changed from busi-
ness to professions by the requirement that they are to be licensed. 6
That the right to conduct a lawful business is a property right is settled
law.7 However, every owner's use of his property is subject to a valid ex-
ercise of the police power; that is, when the exercise bears a reasonable
relation to the public health, comfort, morals, safety and general welfare.,
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,9 the Supreme Court of the United
States said, "nothing is more clearly settled than that it is beyond the
power of the state, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily to
interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose
unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them."'10
Thus it is established that the power of the legislature to regulate pro-
fessions and businesses is not absolute but is subject to reasonable restric-
tions. Regulations that cut off the inherent right to engage in a lawful
business must bear some direct relation to the health, safety, morals or
welfare of those affected.1
However, the police power of the state in not to be as narrowly defined
as these authorities might tend to indicate. The police power is not limited
only to measures needful to subserve the public health, morals and safety.
but can be invoked "to serve the pubilc convenience and general pros-
perity and well-being.''12
In declaring parts of the Act in question unconstitutional, the court
cited Abelson's Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists,'8 wherein
the court said, "But in the final analysis, it is the nature of the subject
matter and the end to be served that determine the quality and content
of the regulatory power."' 4
5 Babcock v. Laidlaw, 113 N.J. Eq. 318, 166 Atl. 632 (1933); In re Dawson, 136 Okla.
113, 277 Pac. 226 (1929).
6 Busse & Borgmann Co. v. Upchurch, 60 Ohio App. 349, 21 N.E. 2d 349 (1938).
7 Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1923); Transamerican Freight Lines
v. U.S., 51 F. Supp. 405 (Del., 1943); McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203,
85 P. 2d (1938); Freeman v. Board of Adjustment of Great Falls, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.
2d 534.
8 Hannifind Corp. v. Berwvn, 1111. 2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953).
9 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 1o Ibid.
11 Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 88 A. 2d 607 (1952);
Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs of Montclair, 124 N.J. L. 135, 11 A. 2d 304 (1940);
Watchung Lake v. Molens, 119 N.J.L. 272, 196 Atl. 223 (1938); State ex rel. Vars v.
Knott, 135 Fla. 206, 184 So. 752 (1938); F. E. Nugent Funeral Home v. Beamish, 315 Pa.
345, 173 AtI. 177 (1934).
12Regal Oil Co. v. State, 123 N.J.L. 456, 10 A. 2d 495 (1939).
13 5 N.J. 412, 75 A. 2d 867, 14 Ibid., at 870.
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And in the instant case the court said:
And insofar as mortuary science involves the preparation of human remains
for display and interment, involving proficiency in the fields of anatomy, chem-
istry, cosmetic technique and the like, there is obviously a relationship with the
public health and welfare entitling the State, in the exercise of the police power,
to surround that practice with rigid requirements of training, education, licens-
ing and like precautions in the public interest. 15
Other courts have had little or no trouble finding that the business of
embalming and funeral directing is a business affected with a public in-
terest and therefore is subject to regulatory measures which prescribe
qualifications for members who engage in the vocation as well as standards
of conduct for those who qualify.16
After a discussion of the nature of the relationship between the under-
taker and the family and friends of the decedent, the court in the instant
case refused to accept the proposition that there was a need for a personal,
individual, and confidential relationship between the undertaker and the
bereaved.
The exigencies of this relationship, confined as they are to sentiment, are dis-
tinguished from the very tangible dependence of a patient upon his doctor, of a
client upon his lawyer, or of the mentally or spiritually disturbed person upon
his psychiatrist or clergyman. 17
In striking down the Act, it was stated:
Once the State and its Board of Mortuary Science have secured the health
and welfare of the public in the usual sense, by its education, licensing and like
provisions pertaining to the technical treatment of the human remains, and asso-
ciated services such as interment, this is as far as the State can go in regulating
what is otherwise a private property right, i.e., the doing of business in the corpo-
rate frame.' 8
This decision is particularly worthy of note in Illinois because there is
a statute in this state19 with wording very similar to that contained in the
New Jersey statute. 20 This particular section of the statute has never been
the subject of litigation in this state.
From the reported decisions it appears that the state of the law of Illi-
15 Trinka Services, Inc. v. State Board of Mortuary Science, 40 N.J. Super. 238, 122 A.
2d 668-669 (1956).
16 State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers v. Cooksey, 147 Fla. 337, 3 S. 2d
502 (1941); Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Board of Embalming & Funeral Directing,
55 R.I. 454, 182 AtI. 808 (1936).
17Trinka Services Inc. v. State Board of Mortuary Science, 40 N.J. Super. 238,
122 A. 2d 668, 670 (1956).
18 Ibid., at 670.
19 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 111, § 73.8a.
20 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) c. 45, §§ 7-32, 7-81.
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nois in regard to the conflict between property rights and the police
power is the same as that of New Jersey. The court in Lasdon v. Halliban
said that while a person's business, profession or occupation is property
within the meaning of the due process clause, the power of the legislature
to interfere by passing laws for the preservation of good order or to pro-
mote public welfare and safety, or to prevent fraud, deceit, cheating and
imposition, has always been recognized in Illinois. 21
In Gadlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, the court said:
Legislative determination that regulations are needful . . . in order to be im-
posed must bear some definite, substantial relation to the public health, safety
morals or public welfare. 22
The decision in the instant case will no doubt be of benefit and impor-
tance if the corresponding section of the Illinois statute23 is ever involved
in litigation. The final determination of the question, however, will lie in
the opinion of the court as to whether the regulation bears definite, sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. 24
21377 I11. 187, 36 N.E. 2d 227 (1941).
22414 111. 89, 95, 110 N.E. 2d 234, 237 (1953); cf. Hannifin Corp. v. Berwyn, 1 111.
2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953).
231 11. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 1111, § 73.8a.
24 Hannifin v. Berwyn, 1 111. 2d 28, 115 N.E. 2d 315 (1953); Gadlin v. Auitor of
Public Accounts, 414 I11. 89, 110 N.E. 2d 234 (1953); Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 I11. 187,
36 N.E. 2d 227 (1941).
DIVORCE-ILLINOIS 60-DAY "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Plaintiff sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk
of court to receive and file a complaint for divorce without first filing a
praecipe for summons as required by the 1955 amendment to the Divorce
Act' which provides for a 60-day "cooling-off period" between service
of the summons and filing of the complaint, except in cases specifically
provided for.2 Plaintiff contended that the act was violative of due process,
in that it was vague, indefinite, and uncertain; that it contravened Art. VI,
sec. 29, of the Illinois constitution, which provides that "all laws relating
to courts shall be general, and of uniform operation;" and that it violated
Art. IV, sec. 22, of the Illinois constitution, which states: "The General
Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases, that is to say: For-Granting divorces." The trial court
denied mandamus, and on direct appeal the Illinois Supreme Court held
I Ill. Rev. Star. (1955) c. 40, §§ 7a, 7b.
2 Ibid., at S 7c.
